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“Corporations are not responsible for all the world’s problems,
nor do they have the resources to solve them all . . .[but], a well run
business . . . can have a greater impact on the social good than any
other institution or philanthropic organization.”1
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1. Porter, M.E., Kramer, M.R., Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 78, 92 (2006). Porter and
Kramer presented an updated contextualizaton of Friedman argument that “there is one and only
one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open
and free competition without deception or fraud.” Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Sept. 13, 1970, at 124, reprinted in
BUSINESS ETHICS 17 (Tamara L. Roleff ed., 1996).
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Business leaders,2 policy makers,3 key stakeholders,4 and scholars5
have long recognized that the corporation, the most powerful global
institution, can and should be more attuned to human needs.6 Now, as
the world experiences the first financial crisis of the twenty-first
century,7 many individuals and groups recognize the need for a refined
balance among government, the economy, and civil society.8 As the
current financial crisis originated with American transnational

2. A Stitch in Time, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 12, 13 fig.5 (responding to the query:
“[w]hat are the main business benefits to your organisation of having a defined corporateresponsibility policy?”). Business leaders provided a range of responses, such as “[h]aving a better
brand reputation,” “[m]aking decisions that are better for our business in the long term,” “[b]eing
more attractive to potential and existing employees,” “[m]eeting ethical standards required by
customers,” and “[h]aving better relations with regulators and lawmakers.” Id.
3. Stefano Zamagni, Religious Values and Corporate Decision Making: An Economist’s
Perspective, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 573, 581 (arguing that consumers who use their
purchasing power to express moral sentiments motivate policy-makers to seek corporations that are
more socially responsible).
4. The key stakeholders we refer to include unions. See Marleen A. O’Connor, Organized
Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1345, 1346 (discussing the alliance of unions with those seeking to promote a greater sense of
corporate social responsibility).
5. See, e.g., Don Mayer, Corporate Citizenship and Trustworthy Capitalism: Cocreating a
More Peaceful Planet, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 237 (2007) (considering links between corporate behavior
and peaceful, sustainable societies); Timothy L. Fort, The Times and Seasons of Corporate
Responsibility, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 287 (2007) (suggesting that corporate focus on profitability puts
people, businesses, and the free market at risk); Thomas W. Dunfee & Timothy L. Fort, Corporate
Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, and the Adapted Firm, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563 (2003)
(using the language of “hypergoals” to highlight universal principles that govern a wide range of
organizations). Dunfee and Fort’s work considers how corporations can achieve sustainable peace.
Id. Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting From Salbu to the “Tipping Point”: The Role of
Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 471
(2001) (considering improved corporate behavior in the context of corruption in international
business); Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and Global Capitalism, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 215
(2001) (contributing to dialogues about community, corporate ethics, and the generation of potent
moral norms); Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights from
Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 261 (2001) (making the concept of CSR useful by
drawing insights from legal and economic theory).
6. George Cheney, Juliet Roper & Steve May, Overview, in THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (Steve May, George Cheney & Juliet Roper eds., 2007).
7. See Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations on the
“Big-Picture” Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157, 158
(2009) (contextualizing the scope of the financial crisis). Omarova explains its focal point as the
inherent tension “between the increasingly globalized and interconnected nature of today’s financial
markets, on the one hand, and an inherently fragmented nationally-based approach to financial
sector regulation and supervision and regulation, on the other.” Id. He further argues that prior
financial crises were either generally confined to emerging markets or to certain developed
countries, with only minimal collateral effect. Id. In the current crisis, however, every economy,
irrespective of its geographical location, size, or developmental status, has been affected. Id.
8. Cheney, Roper & May, supra note 6, at 4.
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corporations (TNCs),9 calls for reform have highlighted the political
clout of TNCs,10 especially in reference to their singular ability to affect
global economic activity11 and human rights.12 Traditional approaches13
to reform highlight legislative action, while contemporary approaches14
draw from a wide range of action, including voluntary action, that

9. Omarova, supra note 7, at 161. Lehman Brothers and American International Group
(AIG) are two examples.
10. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 933 (2004).
11. Joe W. (Chip) Pitts, III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future
Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & POL’Y 334, 380 (2009) (arguing that TNCs occupy a unique role in
their ability to affect significant social change). Pitts explains that since “a relatively small number
of TNCs represents a large proportion of global economic activity,” successful efforts to prevail
upon corporate behavior can result in a significant social impact. Id.
12. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 10, at 933 (arguing that the economic and political muscle of
TNCs uniquely position them to significantly impact the enjoyment of human rights). Kinley and
Tadaki explain that the concerted efforts of myriad entities—from workers, states, and NGOs to the
TNCs themselves—are needed to highlight the behavior of TNCs and to hold them accountable for
such behavior under international human rights law. Id. The authors further argue that since TNCs
habitually compartmentalize their economic interests and concern for human rights as distinct and
unrelated aspects of their interest, TNCs habitually treat concern for human rights as a peripheral
matter. Id. As such, the authors call on “every individual and every organ of society” to defend the
value of human dignity by prevailing upon TNCs to conceptualize their economic bottom line and
basic human dignity as fundamentally inseparable. Id. at 1022.
13. Although all authors listed in this footnote use the terms “hard” (e.g., laws) and “soft”
(e.g., corporate codes) to describe various modes of social control, this article reframes “soft”
approaches as contemporary and “hard” approaches as traditional. This re-framing reflects our
appreciation for New Governance, especially its less adversarial, more collaborative approach. See
Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-based Securities Regulation, 45 AM.
BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2008) (conceptualizing a New Governance framework for securities regulation).
Ford explains that it would entail a regulatory structure that “spans the so-called public/private
divide, pulls industry experience into regulatory decision making, and establishes robust ongoing
communication mechanisms [rather than an information-hoarding, adversarial relationship between
industry and regulator].” Id. For articles utilizing the “hard” and “soft” terminology, see Pitts,
supra note 11; John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005); Amiram
Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
452 (2008); Peer Zumbansen, The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law, 13
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 261 (2006).
14. See generally Pitts, supra note 11, at 337-42, 373-82 (describing antiquated approaches to
CSR and pointing to more contemporary approaches). Pitts explains that corporations engaging in
apparent “voluntary” good governance initiatives should be viewed as engaging not in voluntary
behavior, but in more “legal” substantive and sanctionable behavior than many commentators
realize. Id. He goes on to describe such voluntary initiatives as ahead of the regulatory curve by
being more responsive to market forces than the legislative process. Id. at 415. He argues that
enlightened companies increasingly understand that reasonable regulation, which need not be topdown and legally mandated, can be of the “more nuanced varieties of information regulation and
meta-regulation/enforced self-regulation [that] is indispensable to effectively functioning,
sustainable markets.” Id. Such behavior, Pitts argues, is a contemporary approach to corporate
reform. Id.
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incentivize corporations to be more responsive to societal needs.15 Most
importantly, contemporary approaches to reform explore intersections
between corporate social responsibility (CSR)16 and new approaches to
corporate governance, or the “New Governance.”17
CSR seeks improved behavior from corporations.
It asks
corporations to broaden relationships with multiple stakeholders,18
engage in meaningful and sustained efforts to improve communities,19
and/or to conform to society’s rules—those embodied in both law and
ethical custom.20 In recent years, CSR has focused on corporate
governance as a means through which its maxims may be incorporated
into the business decisionmaking processes.21 New Governance is a
phraseology that refers to a fresh approach to reform that encourages
dialogue about regulatory principles from the perspectives of industry,
regulators, CSR advocates, and shareholders.22 Indeed, dialogues about

15. Gill, supra note 13, at 452-55 (arguing that corporate governance is adjusting from its
traditional focus on agency conflicts to a focus on the contemporary issues of transparency,
accountability, and ethics). Gill explains that the corporate social responsibility movement is
increasingly focusing on corporate governance as a means by which corporations can be
incentivized to be more attuned to societal needs. Id.
16. Conley & Williams, supra note 13.
17. While New Governance theory is complex and its terminology and taxonomies are often
contested, a core element in virtually all formulations, however, is the idea of the “postregulatory
state.” The essence of this idea is that regulatory power is diffused progressively among networks
of state and nonstate actors that transcend national boundaries. See generally Colin Scott,
Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 145 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004) (exploring theoretical approaches
to regulation and providing a foundation for New Governance scholarship).
18. Cheney, Roper & May, supra note 6, at 3.
19. Id.
20. Friedman, supra note 1, at 33 (describing the responsibility of the corporate executive).
Friedman argues that this responsibility “is to conduct business in accordance with [the
shareholder’s] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom.” Id. While Friedman articulates this point as a response to the CSR movement, he
fails to consider how ethical custom and the law interact. Indeed, he fails to consider that ethical
custom and the law are, in fact, interdependent. See Cyrus Mehri, Andrea Giampetro-Meyer &
Michael B. Runnels, One Nation, Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote
Transparency, Accountability and Workplace Fairness, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 395, 407
(2004).
21. Gill, supra note 13, at 463-66; see also Cheney, Roper & May, supra note 6, at 4
(explaining that conversations about unchecked corporate power are central to conversations about
how to “probe in an informed and systematic way the potentials for positive social change in,
through, and around the modern corporation”); Conley & Williams, supra note 13, at 37-38
(describing CSR as “a complex communication network among public and private actors,” which,
“[a]t its best, promises a corporate decisionmaking process in which managers think and talk openly
about social and environmental issues and then tell the world what they did and why”).
22. Ford, supra note 13, at 5.
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New Governance include CSR principles and more. New Governance
promotes systems that “use[] innovative, pragmatic, information-based,
iterative, and dialogic mechanisms to gather, distill, and leverage
industry learning in the service of a still-robust but better designed, that
is, more effective and less burdensome, public regulatory mandate.”23
New Governance envisions decision making as a collaborative, rather
than an adversarial process.24
In The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social
Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux,25 Professor Edward M.
Epstein, a chief architect of what we now call the field of CSR, engages
with New Governance scholarship.26 Epstein acknowledges the power
of TNCs to actualize the goals of CSR and considers what factors may
incentivize TNCs to become “Good Companies,” ideal companies27 that
undertake behavior that maximizes benefits for society.28 In particular,
he describes six factors—law, affinity group regulation, self-regulation,
ethical precepts, the media, and an engaged civil society—as “modes of
social control”29 that encourage TNCs to engage in socially beneficial
behavior.30 Epstein’s work provides a practical framework that allows

23. Id. at 5 (describing the British Columbian (Canada) model as an example of the New
Governance). Ford defines the linchpin of this model as a substantially altered relationship between
regulators and industry—a relationship not defined by inflexible regulators mandating rules that are
often incompatible with fast-paced business environments, but a relationship defined by a shared
responsibility and a pragmatic responsiveness to “complex real-life social systems.” Id. at 27-28.
Ford goes on to describe this New Governance as providing a rational, systemic alternative to
draconian rule-making and their often adverse effects of business—and as the “most effective
mechanism for making decisions in complex organizational structures.” Id. This, Ford argues, is an
opportunity for “dialogic and transparent securities regulation,” viewed from the perspective of
industry, regulators, shareholders, stakeholders, and CSR advocates. Id. at 60.
24. See supra note 13.
25. Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social
Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 27 (2007).
26. Professor Emeritus, Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley. He does
not actually use the phrase “New Governance.” Professor Epstein has written about the conceptual
foundations of business in society for over thirty years. See, e.g., EDWIN M. EPSTEIN,
CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATION IN
PERSPECTIVE (1968).
27. Epstein, supra note 25, at 212-13.
28. Id. (arguing that CSR is inherently insufficient in achieving the Good Company). Epstein
provides his own framework and describes TNCs, by virtue of their economic and political power,
as the most efficient proxies through which his framework can encourage the actualization of the
Good Company. Id.
29. Id. at 210-12.
30. Id. at 220 (discussing the desire for more socially responsible corporations). Epstein
writes that he envisions “better companies, organizations that continuously seek to perform the
economic functions for which society relies upon them in a manner that optimizes the firm’s utility
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scholars to engage in a systematic review of ways to harness the best
corporate behavior.
The purpose of this Article is to apply Epstein’s Good Company
framework to corporate behavior that falls under three distinct
employment law issues31 that continually challenge TNCs as they
conduct business.32 Part I summarizes Epstein’s Good Company
framework and his insights about the Good Company.33 Part II
integrates Epstein’s Good Company framework with TNCs’ ability to
curb the use of abusive forms of child labor (enact responsible child
labor policies), foster open, democratic, and collaborative workplaces
(improved employer-employee bargaining), and to create an ethic of care
for employees (ethic of care).34 Part III briefly analyzes our findings,
suggests modifications to Epstein’s Good Company framework, and
positions the modifications in the context of New Governance
scholarship.35 The article concludes by affirming Epstein’s approach to
the Good Company and offers final reflections about fostering Good
Companies in the employment context.
I. THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF GOOD COMPANIES
A.

Epstein’s Description of the Contemporary Setting

In The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social
Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux,36 Epstein succinctly details

to the diverse stakeholders affected by their actions and minimizes the deleterious effects . . . of
their operations.” Id.
31. These three issues, child labor, employee-employer bargaining, and the cultivation of an
ethic of care for employees, involve basic human rights and are issues that TNCs, more than most
nation states, have the power to affect. See Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of
“Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 326 (2001) (arguing
that issues such as “worker exploitation” and “economic imperialism” emanate from TNCs, “whose
power exceeds that of most nation states”); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. The Article engages in a metaphorical search for Epstein’s Good Company, a company
that illustrates the ideal in terms of respect for both financially sound business decisionmaking and
human rights.
33. See infra notes 35-89 and accompanying text. The Good Company is shaped, and/or held
accountable by modes of social control, such that these TNCs are powerful corporate engines that
work for “socially efficacious purposes.”
34. See infra notes 90-213 and accompanying text. For each issue (ethic of care, improved
bargaining, and responsible child labor policies), Part II asks which modes of social control are most
likely to incentivize TNCs to engage in socially efficacious behavior.
35. See infra notes 214-40 and accompanying text.
36. Epstein, supra note 25.
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the externalities37 linked with the operation of TNCs.38 Noting the
evolution of the corporate form from organizations designed to benefit
the public good39 to the modern TNC, Epstein considers questions
regarding CSR to be the natural outgrowth of this evolution.40 Epstein
frames the significance of these questions by defining the contemporary
setting of TNCs.41
There are four phenomena that define this contemporary setting:
globalization, the energy crisis, technological revolutions, and social
transformations.42 Each phenomenon will be described in turn.
Transnational business activity is creating a globalized economy in
which modern communications and transportation technologies are
rendering geographical barriers non-existent.43 TNCs, Epstein argues,
originated and will continue to serve as the prime instrumentalities of
this process.44 As to the energy crisis, Epstein argues that industrialized
countries’ dependence on fossil fuels is affecting the geopolitical
balance of power in ways that empower corrupt petroleum-exporting
countries that have poor track records in human rights.45 The
increasingly complex relationship between TNCs dealing in petroleum
and the regimes controlling these resources raises questions about whose

37. CSR is often viewed by scholars as a means to reduce negative corporate externalities.
Geoffrey Heal, a Columbia Business School professor, also takes this view, defining CSR as “a
program of actions taken to reduce externalized costs or to avoid distributional conflicts.” Geoffrey
Heal, Corporate Social Responsibility – An Economic and Financial Framework 1 (Dec. 2004),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=642762 (unpublished).
38. Epstein, supra note 25, at 207-08 (discussing the nature of TNCs).
Early on, it became apparent that these companies, trusts, and enterprises, in addition to
being highly effective structures for developing complex industrial economies, were very
significant social, political, and cultural institutions-- individually and collectively,
possessing considerable power and profoundly affecting all aspects of society from the
local to the global.
Id.
39. Id. at 216 (arguing that the notion of TNCs having a responsibility to serve the public
interest is rooted in the fact that the earliest corporations were designed to meet certain public
service objectives, such as building “turnpikes, railroads, and canals . . . and [stimulating] the
growth of essential industries”). Epstein further argues that “it is ironic that modern society is only
now returning to recognition of these societal objectives of corporate enterprise.” Id.
40. Id. at 207 ( “[I]t is the emergence of large scale business organizations in the last third of
the nineteenth century within Europe and the United States that gave rise to concerns about
corporate social responsibility . . . .”).
41. Id. at 208.
42. Id. at 208-10.
43. Id. at 208-09.
44. Id. at 209.
45. Id.
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interests the TNCs are truly serving.46 Indeed, as the energy crisis
continues to develop, inevitable questions of conflicts of interest arise.47
The third phenomenon Epstein uses to define the contemporary
setting is the advent of myriad technological revolutions.48 From hightech and biotech to technological developments in traditional economic
sectors,49 these revolutions are so ingrained in the stream of commerce
that virtually every human being is affected—for good and for ill.50
TNCs, frequently in relationships with government entities,51 often
originate and spur these revolutions—revolutions that dramatically
improve the quality of life for some, while diminishing the quality of life
for other global citizens.52 Finally, the three aforementioned phenomena
galvanize the social transformations that accompany the rise of TNCs.53
The rise of corrupt regimes awash in petrodollars and the role
technology plays in raising global awareness of the deprivations and
entitlements resulting from growing corporate power, Epstein argues,
frames the reality that TNCs inhabit.54 As the maldistribution of the
benefits of a global economy inflames local and international politics,55
the social influence of TNCs becomes apparent. Indeed, Epstein argues
that when TNCs invest in host regions, respect human rights, employ
best practices, contribute to the development of an educated workforce,
protect the health of their workers, and are not in league with corrupt
regimes, they are forces for good in these areas.56 However, when TNCs

46. Id. at 221 (highlighting the behavior of the United Fruit Company in various parts of Latin
America in addition to energy companies in the Middle East and Africa). Epstein reasons that “[a]t
times, transnational corporations have even acted as de facto governments in countries with weak
political institutions.” Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 209.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (discussing such phenomena). “The shedding of colonial domination, the creation of
the United Nations as a forum for less developed countries to influence international developments
and consciousness, and the impact of communications technologies . . . have contributed to an
awareness of deprivations and entitlements on the part of persons throughout the world.” Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 209-10 (discussing the influence of TNCs in these disparities). Epstein argues that
TNCs “play an important role in facilitating global peace or exacerbating global conflict” that result
from this maldistribution. Id.
56. Id. at 214.
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sustain policies that are exploitative of less developed nations, their
behavior has ruinous effects on regional and global peace.57
B.

Epstein’s Description of Modes of Social Control

Within this contemporary setting, Epstein considers what factors, or
modes of social control, are central to the actualization of the Good
Company.58 Epstein defines six modes of social control in descending
order of importance—law, affinity group regulation, self-regulation,
ethical precepts, the media, and an engaged civil society—that,
individually and in combination, are paramount in achieving the Good
Company.59 Each mode will be described, in turn, below.
Epstein places law first in terms of its importance, but also
postulates that law, the articulation of public policy enforced by
government, is an inherently impractical mode of social control in
achieving the Good Company in the fast-paced business environment.60
As the creation of law is a customarily extended process,61 laws created
for TNCs operating in fast-paced business environments often constitute
dated answers to yesterday’s problems.62 Epstein defines “affinity group
regulation” as standards of behavior established by members of a
particular profession, such as law or medicine.63 Those TNCs operating
under seriously administered affinity regulations can be encouraged to
have positive impacts on the social good.64 Self-regulation, on the other
hand, pertains to voluntary adherence to standards set by
nongovernmental entities [NGOs] concerned with specific issues,65 such
as child labor and third-world apparel manufacturing.66 These standards
often establish baselines that allow TNCs to act in the public good

57. Id. (noting the supposed benefits of free trade). Epstein maintains that the benefits have,
in fact, “been asymmetrical, benefiting wealthier nations and contributing to interstate and intrastate
conflicts.” Id.
58. Id. at 210.
59. Id. at 212.
60. Id. at 210 (considering the impractical nature of law as a mode of social control for
corporations in the modern economy). Epstein reasons that the impracticality is rooted in the law’s
inability to “anticipate the virtuously limitless array of issues and concerns occasioned by corporate
actions.” Id.
61. Id. (arguing that this extended process is a product of asymmetrical balances of power and
centrality of arriving at compromise).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 211.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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without competitive disadvantage.67 However, engagement in socially
efficacious practices occurs only to the degree to which TNCs observe
these standards in good faith,68 a concern highlighted by the lack of any
enforcement mechanisms.69
Epstein characterizes ethical precepts as beliefs derived from
religion, humanistic philosophy, social customs, mores, and traditions.70
If one considers law as the lowest common denominator of the social
contract,71 ethics operate above this common denominator and often
inform the creation of the law. However, those modes of social control
derived from social custom, mores, and tradition can result in manifestly
unethical behaviors such as “honor killings” of women who are deemed
to have violated social norms.72 Since it is often the first source of
information about corporate malfeasance, a vigilant and responsible
media, Epstein argues, is central to promoting Good Companies.73 In
this way, TNCs can be held increasingly accountable for illegal and/or
unethical behavior.74 Alternatively, favorable media coverage can result
in increased business activity and serve as a catalyst for the actualization
of Good Companies.75 Finally, Epstein argues that an engaged civil
society is a mode of social control that can encourage socially
efficacious behavior from TNCs.76 Direct citizens’ action through the
leveling of pressure on government officials, for example, thwarted WalMart’s efforts to move into several San Francisco Bay Area
communities.77 While other successful examples abound,78 direct citizen
action is not always effective in fostering the Good Company.79
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also SIMON COUNSELL & KIM TERJE LORAAS, THE RAINFOREST FOUND.,
TRADING IN CREDIBILITY: THE MYTH AND REALITY OF THE FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL 30-34,
http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/Trading_Credibility.pdf (noting the concerns raised in response
to the occasional deceptiveness and hypocrisy of CSR commitments formally made, though not
honored). The authors further argue that these voluntary efforts must be seriously reformed to
enhance actual accountability. Id.
69. Epstein, supra note 25, at 211.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 211-12.
72. Id. at 212.
73. Id..
74. Id. (noting the role of the media in exposing corporate malfeasance). Epstein highlights
the disclosures relating to the Enron scandal and suspect marketing strategies relating to major
pharmaceutical companies. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See generally María Elena Durazo, Making Movement: Communities of Color and New
Models of Organizing Labor, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 235 (2006).
79. Epstein, supra note 25, at 212.
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Epstein’s Insights

As noted earlier,80 Epstein considers the CSR movement alone, as
fundamentally incapable of achieving the Good Company. This view is
not based on any belief in the inherent malevolence of the human
condition, but rather, Epstein explains, on a recognition of the structures
that comprise the contemporary business environment—structures that
TNCs and their corporate managers must abide by.81 An increasingly
competitive globalized economy, driven by the Anglo-American modus
operandi of short-term profit maximization,82 structures environments
where TNCs are incentivized to cut corners with regards to employees,
communities, developing nations,83 and myriad stakeholders burdened
by corporate behavior.84 Moreover, Epstein argues, conflicting cultural
norms as to what constitutes ethical behavior85 further restrains the
actualization of the Good Company.86 In this context, TNCs are neither
inherently good nor bad, but hold the manifest ability to amplify either
on a global scale.87 Accordingly, given the origin of the corporation88
and its singular ability to impact the public good,89 Epstein offers his
modes of social control as the metrics by which the Good Company can
be achieved.90
II. MODES OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
A.

Responsible Child Labor Policies

In today’s globalized economy, one out of every seven children91
works92 in a range of “economic activities.”93 Many view child labor,

80. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
81. Epstein, supra note 25, at 212-13.
82. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Culture and Trans-Border Effects: Northern Individualism
Meets Third-Generation Human Rights, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 865, 878 (2002) (considering the
adverse effect of TNCs singular focus on short-term profit maximization on human rights).
83. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
86. Epstein, supra note 25, at 213.
87. Id. at 213-14; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text; infra Part I-A (discussing
the corporate capacity to amplify a range of ethical and unethical behavior).
88. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
91. Those persons under the age of 18 are understood to be “children.” INT’L LABOUR ORG.
[ILO], Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, at art. 2, ILO Treaty Doc. No. 106-5, 2133
U.N.T.S. 161 (June 17, 1999) [hereinafter Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention]; see also INT’L
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per se, as morally repugnant;94 a view fueled by the increasing
globalization of trade and, correspondingly, the growing influence of
TNCs.95 While there are a number of domestic laws,96 international
treaties, and conventions97 designed to curb TNCs’ abusive use of child
labor, such use remains prevalent.98 Given the seeming intractability of
the child labor problem, adopting Epstein’s modes of social control
framework, as a means by which to discern viable disincentives for

LABOUR ORG. [ILO], Convention on the Rights of the Child, at art. 1, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov. 20,
1989) (providing that “a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”) [hereinafter Convention on the
Rights of a Child].
92. See Child Domestics: The World’s Invisible Workers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 10,
2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/10/africa8789.htm; Int’l Labour Org., Facts on Child
Labour 2006 (2006), http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=2899; Press
Release, Int’l Labour Org., World Day Against Child Labour 2007 (June 12, 2007), available at
http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=4048.
93. The term “economic activity” is defined as encompassing the “most productive activities
undertaken by children, whether for the market or not, paid or unpaid, for a few hours or full time,
on a causal or regular basis, legal or illegal; it excludes chores undertaken in the child’s own
household or schooling.” INT’L LABOUR ORG., THE END OF CHILD LABOUR: WITHIN REACH 6
(2006), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf.;
see
also
LAKSHMIDHAR MISHRA, CHILD LABOUR IN INDIA 46-47 (2000) (contextualizing the demands of
child laborers). Mishra describes the transportation of children in Sivakasi, Tamilnadu, in India, to
a workshop specializing in the production of matches and notes that:
The factory bus leaves the factory premises around 6 p.m. It drops the children on the
way, while the nearest village is 1 km from the factory, the farthest one is about 20 km.
The bus . . . reaches the last village by 8 to 9 p.m. The bus starts from that village
between 3 to 4 a.m. with the last child and proceeds towards the factory. It reaches the
factory premise around 6 a.m. The sleeping children are thereafter dumped into a hall to
sleep up to 7 a.m. After that . . . they have their breakfast and start work.
Id.
94. See M. Neil Browne, Alex Frondorf, Ronda Harrison-Spoer & Sumangali Krishnan,
Universal Moral Principles and the Law: The Failure of One-Size-Fits-All Child Labor, 27 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 1 (2004) (detailing the views, mostly held by Westerners, of child labor and discussing the
counter-productiveness of considering the occurrence of child labor as inherently amoral).
95. Id. at 15.
96. We refer here to the domestic laws in the host countries of TNCs.
97. See David L. Parker, Child Labor: The Impact of Economic Exploitation on the Health
and Welfare of Children, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 177, 180-81 (1999). Parker discusses the regulatory
structure adopted by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child as examples of international agreements that call on signatories to work
for a future in which the rights of children are respected. See Convention on the Rights of a Child,
supra note 90; see also Susan O’Rourke Von Streunsee, Violence, Exploitation and Children:
Highlights of the U.N. Children’s Convention and International Response to Children’s Human
Rights, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 589, 594-627 (1995) (describing the rights attributed to
children as agreed to by those nations who ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
98. See BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, [CHILD LABOR
REPORT]
CHAPTER
I:
INTRODUCTION,
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/sweat5/chap1.htm.
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TNCs’ use of child labor, provides a contemporary analysis. To this
effect, the utility of each mode will be discussed, in turn, below.
Epstein lists his modes of social control in descending order of
importance:99 law, affinity group regulation, self-regulation, ethical
precepts, the media, and an engaged civil society. However, due to the
distinctive nature of the child labor problem, this Article alters the
modes’ order of importance, as prescribed by Epstein, to an order more
specifically tailored to the challenges posed by TNCs’ use of child labor.
Given that critiques of child labor often stem exclusively from core
ethical beliefs,100 and given the interdependence of law and ethics,101 the
ethics mode will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of law. A
discussion of the other modes of social control in a reconfigured order of
importance, concluding with affinity group regulation, will then follow.
In an increasingly globalized world, concepts such as justice,
fairness, and ethics are often rendered nebulous. Indeed, the use of child
labor is not necessarily seen as unethical in developing countries.102
While child labor might be considered morally abhorrent in the West,
children in developing countries often need to work in order to sustain
the health and welfare of their families.103 From a historical perspective,
however, the primary factor explaining the prevalence of child labor is
poverty,104 both in the East and West.105 In developing countries,
childhood is often seen as a period for acquiring employable skills so
that children may earn better pay when they become older.106 Moreover,
99. Epstein, supra note 25, at 213.
100. See generally supra note 93.
101. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
103. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 10, at 982.
104. See generally supra note 93; Anna A. Kornikova, International Child Labor Regulation
101: What Corporations Need to Know About Treaties Pertaining to Working Youth, 34 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 207, 213 (2008).
105. See Browne et al., supra note 93, at 7 (noting the use of child labor on colonial America
as a necessary cost of doing business). Browne et al. explain that:
In North American colonies, children were an asset—free labor to their families and
their new farms. Child labor was seen as a tool to keep children from idleness, as well as
a necessity for starting a successful colony and farm. However, as part of the changes
necessitated by the American colonists’ desire to be independent from England,
Americans needed to start producing their own goods, such as clothing. To facilitate this
manufacture, the first children began working in American textile and clothing shops.
Children were ideal for working in these factories because they worked for a fraction of
the cost of comparable adult workers. They also were quick to learn, and their small
hands could create the intricate details in the fabrics.
Id.
106. See Shahidul Alam, The Use of Child Labor Does Not Always Violate Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 81, 86 (Mary E. Williams ed., 1998); see also Kinley &
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when parents’ income is insufficient to feed, clothe, and shelter the
family, there are rarely any clear alternatives to child labor.107
Accordingly, when developed countries, or an engaged citizenry within
them, overzealously advocate the complete abolition of child labor from
their particular ethical perspective, they can be seen as both
hypocritical108 and culturally imperialistic109 by not taking into
consideration the economic and social realities of developing
countries.110
While most developing countries agree that the worst forms of
child labor should be prohibited,111 it is unwise to seek international
legal regimes that mandate universal adherence to child labor standards

Tadaki, supra note 10, at 981-82; supra note 93 and accompanying text; Kornikova, supra note 103,
at 213 (describing the responsibilities of children in the developing countries of Africa). Kornikova
explains that, “through their productive activities, children integrate into the community, as in
Africa, where children as young as ten years old begin imitating their family members in the
household and farm tasks, and then move to other tasks, including serving the elders in their
community.” Id.
107. See Browne et al., supra note 93, at 13 (discussing the correlation between economic
development and the ethics of child labor—and the salience of this correlation among different
cultures).
108. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
109. See generally supra note 93.
110. See Browne et al., supra note 93, at 3-4 (noting the dangers of applying moral absolutes to
the child labor issue). Browne et al. note that:
Such international declarations of universal rights are highly attractive in that they
appeal to our sense of humanity; indeed, there are very powerful arguments suggesting
that certain normative states ought to exist among humans regardless of differences in
culture, religion, worldview, geographic location, or economic disposition. However,
scholars and policymakers alike must recognize the inherent danger in wholeheartedly
embracing and imposing a universal moral vision upon other groups in situations as
emotionally, economically, culturally, and developmentally complex as that of child
labor, particularly where power disparity exists.
Id.
Id. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 10, at 982.
111. See Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, infra note 147; see also Kornikova, supra
note 105, at 221 (detailing the treaty obligations). Kornikova writes that:
The Convention applies to all persons under eighteen years of age and focuses on the
abolition of two categories of child labor: the “unconditional worst forms of child labor”
and “hazardous work.” The unconditional worst forms of child labor include “all forms
of slavery or practices similar to slavery,” debt bondage, and the use of children in
various illicit activities. These forms of labor are prohibited unconditionally because
improving their conditions would not justify such practices. . . . [H]azardous work
encompasses “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.” The [Convention] refers to a list
of considerations for identifying “hazardous work” as set forth in ILO Recommendation
No. 190. These considerations include, without limitation, exposure to dangerous
machinery and substances damaging to health.
Id. (citations omitted).
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equivalent to those of developed countries. In cases where attempts
have been made, resistance often originates not with TNCs, but from the
workers these laws are intended to protect.112 In addition, resistance to
these laws frequently come from the governments of developing
countries who not only fear losing the competitive advantage derived
from cheap labor, but suspect that the imposition of such laws masks a
trade protectionism agenda that advantages developed countries.113
Moreover, the adoption of laws stemming from such moral absolutism
can often be counterproductive. During the debate surrounding the 1992
Child Labor Deterrence Act,114 which sought the imposition of sanctions
on those products made with child labor, Bangladeshi activists cautioned
that the dismissal of children from the workplace would effectively
funnel them into more hazardous professions.115 As a result of this focus
on the alleged immorality of child labor, Bangladeshi manufacturers,
between 1992 and 1995, dismissed tens of thousands of children who
ultimately found employment in the rickshaw pulling, brick carrying,
rag-picking, and prostitution professions.116 Consequently, while there
might be universal agreement on the amorality of child labor, it is
quixotic to approach the issue utilizing overarching laws or trade
restrictions seeking an outright ban. Rather, a more comprehensive

112. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 10, at 973.
113. Id.; see Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal
Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 65 (2001); see also Pradeep S. Mehta & Sandeep Singh,
Current Issues in Human Rights, Development and International Trade in the WTO, 13 INTERIGHTS
BULL. 143-45 (2001). At the WTO ministerial conference in Doha, the proposal to link trade and
core labor standards gained virtually no support from developing countries in Asia and was fiercely
opposed by India, Pakistan, and Malaysia. See Internat’l Confed. of Free Trade Unions, The Doha
Declaration: A Trade Union Analysis,
http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991214586&Language=EN (last visited Sept. 13,
2009).
114. Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1992, S. 3133, 102d Cong. (1992).
115. See Shareen Hertel, New Moves in Transnational Advocacy: Getting Labor and Economic
Rights on the Agenda in Unexpected Ways, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 263, 267-68 (2006).
116. See JEREMY SEABROOK, CHILDREN OF OTHER WORLDS: EXPLOITATION IN THE GLOBAL
MARKET 23, 64-65 (2001); WORLD VISION UK, OFFERING HOPE, NOT DESPAIR: ERADICATING
CHILD LABOR WITHOUT PUTTING CHILD WORKERS ON THE STREETS 7 (1997); see also Kornikova,
supra note 105, at 223-24 (contextualizing the debates regarding the 1992 Child Labor Deterrence
Act); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 10, at 974-75 (arguing that a premature ban on child labor, for
example, can have “devastating consequences on workers because it may result in immediate
termination of their employment, leaving them without any alternative means of earning an
income”).
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approach, which identifies and addresses the causes and contexts within
which child labor flourishes, is obligatory.117
Under these circumstances, a vigilant and responsible media,
bolstered by an engaged civil society within the TNC’s host country,
best effectuates such an approach. The power of the media to be a
catalyst for change in TNCs’ child labor policies is irrefutable.118
However, many of these changes frequently result in the adoption of
highly publicized corporate codes of conduct, which some TNCs then
display, with little good faith adhering to,119 or a reactionary dismissal of
the children, which consequently filters them into more dangerous lines
of work.120 As the child labor problem is rooted in the unique
socioeconomic conditions of the TNC’s host country,121 the solutions
ought to be specifically tailored to that country. As such, the media not
only must be vigilant in exposing abuses, but must also be responsible
by making it evident that each country faces distinct challenges and that
the typical reactionary corporate response will not do. In order for the
media to effectively shoulder the burden of its responsibilities in this
regard, an engaged civil society within the TNC’s host country, in

117. See supra note 93, at 6 (discussing the need for more nuance in the child labor debate—a
debate often rooted in arguments claiming moral absolutism). Critiquing the view of the child labor
debate through a morally purist lens, Browne argues:
Declarations of human rights are often a powerful stimulus in focusing attention on
severe human problems. But, such declarations’ attempts to impose a strict, one-sizefits-all moral regulatory structure, absent an analysis of the underlying national,
economic, cultural, and historical factors that might affect the efficacy of such a
structure, constitutes an abdication of responsible policy-making.
Id.
118. See generally Lance Compa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Workers’ Rights, 30
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y. J. 1 (2008) (detailing a list of corporate responses to media exposure of
their child labor practices).
119. See BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE APPAREL
INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD LABOR
PROBLEM? § 3-4 (1996), http:// www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/apparel/apparel.pdf
(revealing that “some companies, particularly retailers, may have general language in their purchase
order or vendor contracts requiring vendors to comply with applicable laws but have no
mechanisms for monitoring compliance”); see also id. at 48 (discussing how TNCs monitor their
facilities for compliance with their corporate codes). The study notes that “[m]onitoring is usually
part of a larger process that includes issues such as quality control and delivery coordination. For
this reason, it is not always clear to what extent site visits focus on the code implementation.” Id.
While monitoring for product quality, and even for health and safety conditions, is
customary in the garment industry, . . . monitoring for compliance with provisions of the
codes of conduct of U.S. garment importers dealing with other labor standards. . . and
child labor in particular . . . is not.
Id. at 101.
120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
121. See generally supra note 93.
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addition to other international sources privy to information in the host
country, is essential in providing the media with accurate information.
Unlike what is called for in Epstein’s self-regulation mode of social
control, which involves the voluntary adoption of standards established
by NGOs concerned with child labor, these NGOs should not seek the
TNC’s adoption of universal child labor standards, which is often
counterproductive.122 The NGOs should collaborate with an engaged
civil society within the TNC’s host country in providing the media with
accurate information, so that the public—and the corporate boardroom—
can be responsibly informed of the complexity of domestic child labor
abuses and of the ways that a socially responsible TNC can respond.123
Such a collaborative approach is emblematic of New Governance—a
systemic process that uses “innovative, pragmatic, information-based,
iterative, and dialogic mechanisms to gather, distill, and leverage
industry learning”124 for the purpose of addressing complex business
challenges. For those TNCs that undertake socially responsible
practices, favorable media coverage can be politically useful and
enhance business activity through the cultivation of corporate
goodwill.125

122. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also supra note 116 and accompanying
text.
123. See H&M, Supply Chain Monitoring: What Do We Do If We Find Child Labor Being
Used?,
http://www.hm.com/us/corporateresponsibility/supplychainworkingconditions/supplychainmonitori
ng/whatwedoifwediscoverchildlabour__monotoringarticle4.nhtml (last visited Sept, 16 2009)
(describing how the apparel and accessories retailer H&M Hennes & Mauritz AB (H&M) responds
when it discovers “underage workers” at its supplier’s site). The site notes that H&M, in
cooperation with the supplier, contacts the family of the affected child and seeks a solution in the
child’s best interests. Id. One such solution is to allow the child to continue education and paying
wages to the child’s family during the child’s stay in school until the child reaches the appropriate
age. Id. See also Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, Enforcing International Labor
Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663, 674-85 (1995)
(describing how Levi Strauss & Co., a multinational apparel company, makes decisions to pay for
the children’s education and school supplies until they reach a minimum age when they would be
offered a job at the plant); STARBUCKS CORPORATION, BEYOND THE CUP: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FISCAL 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2005) (describing how Starbucks Corporation,
an international coffee retailer and coffee-house chain, partnered with Save the Children USA, an
international relief and development organization, in bringing bilingual education to Mayan
communities in Guatemala, which will expand the employment prospects for children in these
communities). These socially responsible activities, providing resources and creating opportunities
for the implementation of child labor standards in the local communities, serve the goals of
addressing the child labor problem more effectively than the often counterproductive dismissal of
the child laborers from work. See note 115 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
125. Epstein, supra note 25, at 212.
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For the same reasons that the law, ethics, and self-regulation modes
of social control fail to be effective tools in addressing the complexity of
the child labor problem—that is, they all seek overarching solutions to a
problem that defies one-size-fits-all solutions—affinity group regulation
will be similarly ineffective.126 Indeed, such morally absolutist
approaches by governments, NGOs, and individuals “constitute[] an
abdication of responsible policy-making,”127 which can have devastating
effects for the intended recipients of their well wishes.128 The nuance
typifying the child labor problem demands the sensitivity that a New
Governance approach provides.
B.

Workplace Democracy

The commitment of a TNC to engage in socially responsible
corporate behavior faces one of its greatest challenges when employees
signal a desire to form a labor union. Good Companies, which endeavor
to foster open, democratic, and collaborative workplaces, recognize that
such environments require an unfettered freedom of association129 and
opportunities for employees to bargain collectively over working
conditions.130 TNCs that respond with interference, intimidation, or
coercion,131 in order to undermine their employees’ right to form a
126. See Browne, et al., supra note 93, at 6 (“[A]ttempts to impose a strict, one-size-fits-all
moral regulatory structure, absent an analysis of the underlying national, economic, cultural, and
historical factors that might affect the efficacy of such a structure, constitutes an abdication of
responsible policy-making”).
127. Id.
128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
129. The right to freedom of association is widely recognized in international instruments,
including the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and the ILO Convention No. 87. Kinley & Tadaki, supra
note 10, at 976.
130. As United Electrical Worker organizers Leah Fried and Mark Meinster explain:
NLRB elections are not democratic. Imagine if you were voting in a municipal election
and you [were] supporting the opposition. Imagine that for eight hours every day, for
three to four months straight, you are being harassed. You have no right to free speech
and you are constantly being threatened. Imagine that if you publicly say you are voting
for the opposition, you lose your job. How can you vote freely in that situation?
NIK THEODORE AND CHIRAG MEHTA, UNDERMINING THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE: EMPLOYER
BEHAVIOR
DURING
UNION
REPRESENTATION
CAMPAIGNS
8
(2005),
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/UROCUEDcompressedfullrep
ort.pdf.
131. According to a recent study by the Economic Policy Institute regarding employer tactics
in union representation elections, employers threatened to close the workplace in 57 percent of
elections, discharged workers in 34 percent, and threatened to cut wages and benefits in 47 percent
of elections. Employees were forced to attend anti-union one-on-one meetings with a supervisor—
at least weekly—in two-thirds of union elections. KATE BRONFENBRENNER, NO HOLDS BARRED:
THE INTENSIFICATION OF EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING 1-2 (2009),
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union, violate fundamental principles of CSR132 and New Governance,133
and yet face few, if any, sanctions for such behavior.134 Although a
majority of workers report that they would choose to belong to a union if
they could make that choice freely, unions represent a shrinking number
of workers in the United States.135 The effect of hostile employer antiunion tactics on union organizing campaigns is both pervasive136 and
effective.137 Three modes of social control in descending order of
importance—law, self-regulation, and a vigilant and responsible
media—can help to reinforce, reproduce, and hold accountable “Better
Companies” that promote workplace democracy while retaining market
competitiveness.

http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/efca/upload/No_Holds_Barred.pdf.
These tactics
represent an increased intensity in the use of coercive and retaliatory actions by employers in order
to undercut majority support for a union.
132. See Pitts, supra note 11, at 341 (describing some of the basic principles of CSR). Pitts
offers seven such principles: “(i) integrated decision-making (to incorporate environmental and
social as well as economic factors), (ii) stakeholder engagement, (iii) transparency and triplebottom-line reporting, (iv) respect for and consistent implementation of the highest global
environmental and social norms and best practices, (v) the precautionary principle, (vi)
accountability, and (vii) community investment.” Id.
133. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 10, at 973.
134. As Prof. Epstein observes, “Firms may be exemplary in their environmental practices and
abominable in their employee policies.” Epstein, supra note 25, at 213.
135. See Richard B. Freeman, Do Workers Still Want Unions? More Than Ever, ECONOMIC
POLICY
INSTITUTE,
Issue
Brief
#182
2
(2007),
available
at
http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp182/bp182.pdf (reporting survey findings that the proportion of
workers who want unions has risen substantially since 1995 and that a majority of nonunion
workers in 2005 would vote for union representation if they could). See also BRONFENBRENNER,
supra note 131 at 4. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, in 2009, the national union
membership rate—the percentage of wage and salary workers who are members of a union—was
12.3 percent. During the prior one-year period, the number of wage and salary workers belonging to
unions declined by 771,000 to 15.3 million. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf..
“In 1983, the first year for which comparable union data are available, the union membership rate
was 20.1 percent, and there were 17.7 million union workers.” Id.
136. A 2002 study examining labor union petitions filed with the NLRB in Chicago found that
while a majority of workers supported unionization when the petition was first filed with the NLRB,
unions were ultimately victorious in only 31 percent of the elections. Theodore & Mehta, supra
note 129, at 8-12. At some point after workers petitioned for union representation, pro-union
workers lost their majority status. Id.
137. Losing an NLRB union recognition is not the only way that employees’ efforts to form a
union are thwarted. A recent study found that 62 percent of new unions are unable to successfully
negotiate a first contract within one year of winning an NLRB election. John-Paul Ferguson, The
Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.,
6 (2008). Under NLRB regulations, if one year has passed with no negotiated union contract,
employees may hold another election to decertify the union. As Harley Shaiken has observed,
“Organizing delayed can be organizing denied.” HARLEY SHAIKEN, UNIONS, THE ECONOMY, AND
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE 8 (2007), http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp181/bp181.pdf.
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The ability of the legal system to promote democracy and improve
working conditions is hampered by the asymmetric balance of power
between employers and employees.138 Labor and employment laws, in
many cases, merely establish the “lowest common denominator of
socially acceptable behavior,” and go no further.139 In order to pressure
their employees to drop their support for a union in their workplace,
TNC managers are free, under federal labor law, to engage in “captive
audience meetings,” enlist supervisors in aggressive one-on-one
meetings with workers about the union campaign,140 and otherwise
communicate alleged dire consequences of unionization to their
employees.141 Current labor law lacks sufficient incentives for TNCs to
refrain from using coercive tactics during a union organizing
campaign.142 Law is not a static mode of social control. Just as a new
legal framework for labor-management relations was created out of the
distress, dislocation, and turmoil of the Great Depression, changes to the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) proposed today may similarly
change the game rules for several stakeholders, including workers,
TNCs, and labor unions.143 Congress has proposed changes to the
NLRA which, if signed into law, would diminish the opportunities for
TNC managers to use tactics of delay, interference, or coercion during

138. Epstein, supra note 25, at 210.
139. Id.
140. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 130, at 9.
141. There do exist, however, some protections for employees, including limitations on
management’s ability to fire or otherwise discriminate against workers for supporting the union; to
threaten the closing of the workplace directly as a result of unionization; to engage in coercive
surveillance of workers; and to unilaterally grant or promise benefits to the work force if they reject
the union. The central instrument in U.S. law for protecting workers’ rights to organize, to bargain
collectively, and to strike is Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (2006). Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice to “interfere with or
coerce” employees engaged in concerted activity. Section 8(a)(3) protects the right to organize by
defining an unfair labor practice of discrimination against workers for protected concerted activities,
including union activity. Section 8(a)(4) makes it unlawful to retaliate against a worker for filing
unfair labor practice charges or giving testimony in NLRB proceedings. Open, direct threats to
close a plant in retaliation for workers’ choosing union representation are considered a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which says, “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.”
However, Section 8(c), the employer free speech clause adopted as part of the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947, has been interpreted by the courts to allow a “prediction” of plant closing if it is “carefully
phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable
consequences beyond his control.” See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
142. Theodore and Mehta, supra note 129, at 5.
143. William B. Gould, IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and
What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the United
States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 292 (2008).
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union organizing campaigns.144 The current draft of the Employee Free
Choice Act (EFCA) would allow the National Labor Relations Board to
certify a union when a majority of employees in that workplace have
signed authorization cards in support of unionization.145 This process,
also called “card check,” would bypass the often lengthy NLRB election
process during which employers routinely pressure employees to
abandon their support of a union. Some industrial relations scholars
have taken a New Governance approach to framing this issue, and argue
that card-check reduces conflict146 and leads to more positive labor
relations.147
Mandating the protection and promotion of workplace democracy
by passing legislation like the Employee Free Choice Act is one way
civil society can encourage corporate behavior that is beneficial, rather
than harmful. A second, complementary, means of promoting such
behavior is created when corporations themselves establish voluntary,
industry-wide workplace standards.148 TNCs can voluntarily adopt
144. Id.
145. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). The Employee Free
Choice Act would amend Section 9(c) of the NLRA, allowing the National Labor Relations Board
to certify a bargaining representative after a majority of employees in the unit file a petition with the
National Labor Relations Board.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, whenever a petition shall have been
filed by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization
acting in their behalf alleging that a majority of employees in a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining wish to be represented by an individual or labor
organization for such purposes, the Board shall investigate the petition. If the Board
finds that a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed
valid authorizations designating the individual or labor organization specified in the
petition as their bargaining representative and that no other individual or labor
organization is currently certified or recognized as the exclusive representative of any of
the employees in the unit, the Board shall not direct an election but shall certify the
individual or labor organization as the representative described in subsection (a).
Id.
146. Adrienne E. Eaton and Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections Versus Card Check Campaigns:
Results of a Worker Survey, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 157, 158-59 (2009). This argument
underpins many of the statutory requirements of card check and neutrality at the state and municipal
levels. A 1998 San Francisco ordinance, for example, which required hotels and restaurants in
which the city has a proprietary interest to use card check as a method to recognize unions, relied on
this argument. Id. at 159.
147. Id. at 158. Most recently, and after an extensive period of consideration, the NLRB issued
its decision in the Dana and Metaldyne cases. The NLRB decided to treat recognitions reached
through voluntary means (like card checks) differently from those reached through an election, by
lifting the “election bar” (a bar on a new representation election pending negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement) for forty-five days following the voluntary recognition. These decisions are
widely regarded to have dealt a critical blow to the right of workers to form a union by voluntary
card check agreement with their employer. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).
148. Epstein, supra note 25, at 210-11.
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internationally recognized standards for workplace standards that help
establish open, democratic, and fair workplaces. Freedom of association
and the right to organize and bargain collectively are two of the core
labor rights articulated by the International Labour Organization’s (ILO)
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.149 When
voluntarily adopted by a critical number of firms within a particular
industry, these baseline standards can enable TNCs to respect the rights
of their employees without experiencing competitive disadvantage.150
Such advantages of voluntarily standards are limited, however, by the
lack of any enforcement mechanisms.151
Given the lack of established mechanisms for enforcement,152 the
more compelling reason for TNCs to voluntarily adopt the ILO standards
may be found in the economics literature and case studies that correlate
unionization and high productivity.153 Innovative Good Companies that
establish open, democratic workplaces, pay workers wages that reflect
market success, and respect the rights of their employees to join a union
and bargain collectively, are more likely to develop motivated,
productive employees.154 Consider the examples of Costco and
Cingular. Despite the fact that Costco spends 40 percent more on labor
costs than its competitor Sam’s Club (a Wal-Mart affiliate), Costco’s

149. INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO], Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
art. 2 (June 17, 1948). These core labor rights were expanded on by the eight fundamental ILO
Conventions. INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO], Forced Labour Convention, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (June 28,
1930); INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO], Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (June
25, 1957); INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO], Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize Convention, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 (July 9, 1948); INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO], Right to Organize
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (July 1, 1949); INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO],
Equal Remuneration Convention, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (June 29, 1951); INT’L LABOUR ORG. [ILO],
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (June 25, 1958); INT’L
LABOUR ORG. [ILO], Minimum Age Convention, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (June 26, 1973); INT’L
LABOUR ORG. [ILO], Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 38 I.L.M. 1207 (June 17, 1999).
150. Epstein, supra note 25, at 211.
151. This lack of enforcement is not universal. In Brazil, for example, captive audience
speeches would not be permitted under Brazilian labor law because they represent a major breach of
workers’ fundamental rights. Roberto Fragale Filho & Ronaldo Lobão, Captive Audience Speech in
the Brazilian Labor Law, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 341, 345 (2008). That they are a clear
breach of freedom of association rights recognized by the ILO Conventions No. 87 (1948) and No.
98 (1949) would render them impermissible in Brazil. Id. They would also violate Article 8 from
the Brazilian Federal Constitution, which grants professional or union-like freedom of association.
Id.
152. Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidel, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 501, 535 (2009).
153. Shaiken, supra note 135, at 5.
154. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss2/3

22

Runnels et al.: Corporate Social Responsibility and the New Governance

RUNNELS_FINAL.DOC

2010]

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NEW GOVERNANCE

5/3/2010 11:28 AM

523

profits are nearly double those of Sam’s Club, a difference attributed to
the significantly lower turnover rates at the partially-unionized
Costco.155 Costco CEO James Sinegal explains, “Most people agree that
we’re the lowest-cost provider. Yet we pay the highest wages. So it
must mean we get better productivity. . . . [T]hat’s not just altruism, it’s
good business.”156 Cingular, the largest wireless carrier in the United
States, accepted a “neutrality agreement” with the Communications
Workers of America (CWA), in which the TNC and the union agreed
not to use hostile or aggressive tactics during the organizing campaign,
and the TNC agreed to card-check rather than the lengthy NLRB process
(a preview of how EFCA might work in practice). After over 85 percent
of Cingular employees joined the union, the company reported that the
union has provided a competitive advantage for the company because
while conflict and disagreement still occur, the union provides a
mechanism with which to work out those issues cooperatively.157 Thus,
by respecting the free association rights of their employees, TNCs
benefit from (a) diminished workplace discord, (b) collaboration among
management and employees in resolving workplace issues, and (c) a
competitive advantage through reduced turnover and other barriers to a
productive workforce.
While appealing to a TNC’s quest for
competitive advantage is not outside the scope of CSR, New Governance
emphasizes the need for such economic efficiency arguments to be
linked with the relevant social ramifications.158 In other words, to be
Good Companies, TNCs should harness the behavior of firms like
Costco and Cingular not only because it is the profitable thing to do, but
also because it is the socially responsible thing to do.
In “ferreting out illegal or unethical corporate behaviors,”159 the
media play a valuable role in educating the public about, and holding
accountable, employer-led opposition and coercion during union
organizing campaigns. Unfortunately, the ability of the news media to
help stimulate socially responsible business behavior is threatened by the

155. Costco produced $21,805 in operating profit per hourly employee in the United States in
2005, almost double the $11,615 generated at Sam’s Club. SHAIKEN, supra note 126, at 5, (citing
Wayne Cascio, Decency Means More than “Always Low Prices”: A Comparison of Costco to WalMart’s Sam’s Club, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Aug. 2006, at 28, 35). Costco’s turnover rate is 6
percent annually compared to 21 percent for Sam’s Club. SHAIKEN, supra note 135, at 6 (citing
Holmes, Stanley, & Wendy Zellner, The Costco Way; Higher Wages Mean Higher Profits. But Try
Telling Wall Street. BUS. WK., April 12, 2004, at 76).
156. SHAIKEN, supra note 135, at 5-6.
157. Id. (citing Marc Gunther, Cingular Bucks Anti-Union Trend, FORTUNE, June 7, 2006).
158. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 10, at 974.
159. Epstein, supra note 25, at 212.
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current climate of newspaper consolidation, downsizing, and
dissolution.160 Newspapers that formerly had a critical mass of labor
writers on staff in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, have dropped the labor
beat entirely.161 Today, only four of the top twenty-five newspapers in
circulation in the United States have full-time labor/workplace reporters:
the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, and Boston
Globe.162 Where traditional labor reporting has diminished, however,
opportunities for developing new forms of media coverage have
arisen,163 underscoring the enduring need for vigilant and responsible
media in an open, democratic society.
C.

Ethic of Care

A Good Company engages in behavior that maximizes benefits for
society. This ideal company treats its employees, customers, and
members of local communities fairly.164 It gives stakeholders165 their
due.166 An ethic of care167 inspires those who embrace stakeholder

160. Television and radio broadcast news-reporting on labor issues is almost nonexistent,
aside from a workplace correspondent employed by National Public Radio. Christopher R. Martin,
Writing Off Workers: The Decline of the U.S. and Canadian Labor Beats, in KNOWLEDGE
WORKERS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 22 (Catherine McKercher & Vincent Mosco eds., 2008).
161. Id. at 23. The New York Times, which had a staff of four labor reporters in the 1960s,
currently has only one such reporter on staff. Id. at 22-23.
162. Id. at 25. This does not include reporting on ancillary or cultural workplace issues, such
as workplace etiquette, fashion, or benefits, which while arguably pertinent, largely exclude labor
issues related to organizing, collective bargaining, and the power dynamics inherent in labormanagement relations.
163. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Now News Blog, http://blog.aflcio.org; Change to Win Connect Blog,
http://www.changetowin.org/connect/.
164. See Epstein, supra note 25, at 214.
165. Stakeholders include owners, management, the local community, customers, employers,
and suppliers. A stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility asks managers to “balance
the multiple claims of conflicting stakeholders.” See R. Edward Freeman, Stakeholder Theory of
the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS AS USUAL 258, 263 (Shari
Collins-Chobanian ed., 2004).
166. Robert G. Kennedy, Virtue and Corporate Culture: The Ethical Formation of Baby
Wolverines, 17 REV. BUS. 10, 14 (1995-1996) (“Fairness may be thought of as the habit of giving to
others what they are due . . . . This virtue comes into play in many ways, not the least of which
concerns attending to the rights and interests of the stakeholders of a firm.”). Epstein provides clear
support for the stakeholder theory of management. He writes, “Maybe our goal should be Better
Companies, or organizations that continuously seek to perform the economic functions for which
society relies upon them in a manner that optimizes the firm’s utility to the diverse stakeholders
affected by their actions and minimizes the deleterious effects…of their operations.” Epstein, supra
note 25, at 220.
167. Conversations about an “ethic of care” are more likely in the health care industry than
others industries. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, A Corporate Ethic of “Care” in Health Care, 3 SEATTLE
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 417 (2004). Hall explains that “care” means “a feeling or attitude rather than an
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perspectives to hope for more than an absence of abuse.168 It reimagines TNCs as companies ready and willing to protect the dignity169
of employees, to engage in deep reflection about right relationships with
stakeholders, and to act with an awareness of which actions promote
well-being.170 An ethic of care acknowledges the significance of human
work.171 It asks employers to appreciate the interconnectedness inherent

action.” An ethic of care calls for “genuine concern for the well-being of . . . customers and
communities.” Id. Hall explains that the health care industry has been at the forefront of
conversations about an ethic of care because “the vulnerability of patients and the suffering caused
by illness create moral conditions that compel and ethic of compassion.” Id. Hall highlights and
ethic of care in health care corporations as a response to social norms. Id. He believes that “[a]
culture of caring about the set of goals and outcomes can be a more powerful and systematic
influence on corporate behavior and attitudes than any overtly regulatory regime.” Id.
168. See Ford, supra note 13, at 41. For a review of abuse in the context of TNCs, see Kinley
& Tadaki, supra note 10, at 933-44. Kinley and Tadaki are aware of the positive impact of TNCs’
foreign direct investment. Id. at 933. They also outline human rights abuses by TNCs, giving as
examples both Nike and The Gap, companies that have been accused of violating workers’ rights.
Id. at 933-34. They also highlight alleged abuses by both Coca-Cola in Columbia and Phillips-Van
Heusen in Guatemala. Id. at 934.
169. Scholars who study the link between Catholic social thought and legal change highlight
the concept of dignity. See, e.g., Adam K. Butman, Bridging the Gap: A Catholic Perspective on
Global Trade as a Tool of Development, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 263 (2007).
Butman states that “[t]he transcendent dignity of the person provides the basis for a Catholic
understanding of the moral dimensions of economic life.” See also Ken Matheny, Catholic Social
Teaching on Labor and Capital: Some Implications for Labor Law, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 1, 13 (2009). Matheny writes that “[e]very economic decision and institution must be
judged in light of whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the human person.” Id. For a
similar statement that is not based upon religious doctrine, see David C. Yamada, Human Dignity
and American Employment Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 524 (2009). Yamada states that “we
need to reframe the intellectual and rhetorical debate over employment law and policy to focus on
the dignity and well-being of workers.” Id. at 524.
170. For an example of an organization in the United States that encourages companies to care,
see The Center for Companies That Care, http://www.companies-that-care.org/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2010). This organization lists criteria for companies that want to be listed as Companies that Care.
Id. The ten characteristics that define a company as caring and responsible are that the organization:
(1) sustains a work environment founded on dignity and respect for all employees; (2) makes
employees feel their jobs are important; (3) cultivates the full potential of all employees; (4)
encourage individual pursuit of work/life balance; (5) enables the well-being of individuals and their
families through compensation, benefits, policies and practices; (6) develops great leaders, at all
levels, who excel at managing people as well as results; (7) appreciate and recognize the
contributions of people who work there; (8) establishes and communicates standards for ethical
behavior and integrity; (9) gets involved in community endeavors and/or public policy; and (10)
considers the human toll when making business decisions. Id.
171. See Matheny, supra note 167, at 10-11. Matheny explains that work is important for a
number of reasons, including that work “is an appropriate way for [a person] to give expression to
and enhance . . . human dignity.” Id. Work is also important because it is necessary to maintain a
family. More fundamentally, “[h]uman work proceeds directly from persons created in the image of
God. . . . Work honors the Creator’s gifts and talents received from him.” Id.
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in company relationships with stakeholders,172 see stakeholders as on par
with themselves,173 accept responsibility for all,174 and respect freedom
and culture.
Globalization,175
technological
revolution,176
and
social
transformations177 shape a contemporary setting that makes an ethic of
care necessary and possible. In a borderless, transparent world, we
know which companies treat workers, customers, and local communities
well. Two modes of social control, working together, create incentives
for firms aspiring to become Good Companies to model an ethic of care,
ethical precepts, and affinity group regulation. When employed in
mutually reinforcing, or intertwined ways, these two modes of social
control offer powerful tools to harness the best in companies.
Ethical precepts, religious doctrines and principles, humanistic
philosophy, feminist thought,178 social customs, mores, and traditions,
yield both formal and informal approaches to inspiring an ethic of care.
High-level religious leaders offer guidelines in formal documents,179
guidelines that encourage and actions that affirm an ethic of care.
Clerics from a range of religious traditions, scholars, and ordinary
citizens180 acting upon religious instruction, theories, and/or customs,
offer a wide range of informal ideas and actions to promote an ethic of

172. This interconnectedness is fundamental to the concept of solidarity. See Butman, supra
note 167, at 275 (“Solidarity centers on the interconnectedness of humanity.”).
173. See id. at 266.
174. See Lois Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445, 461 (2006).
Shepherd urges the reader to “do something”; she writes that if “we really do wish to prevent and
alleviate suffering caused by disease, disability, and pain, then we need to begin talking about
responsibility—accepting our own and requiring others to accept theirs.” Id.
175. Epstein, supra note 25, at 208.
176. Id. at 209.
177. Id. at 209-10.
178. Epstein does not mention that ethical precepts can come from feminist thought. For an
article explaining an ethic of care from a feminist perspective, see Francis Carleton & Jennifer Nutt
Carleton, An Ethic of Care and the Hazardous Workplace, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 283, 284-89
(1995). Carleton & Carleton write that:
An ethic of care refers to the practice of extending care and compassion to vulnerable
individuals and groups who have been harmed or are in harm’s way. The ethic of care is
characterized by “cooperation, relationship, and interdependent nurturance,” and
emphasizes the deep obligation that we owe to one another to protect vulnerable
individuals and groups from harm.
Id.
179. See,
e.g.,
Pontifical
Council
for
Justice
and
Peace,
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/index.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2010), noted in Matheny, supra note 6, at 10.
180. See, e.g., Rebecca Leung, The Mensch of Maiden Mills, CBS NEWS, July 6, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories /2003/07/03/60minutes/main561656.shtml.
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care from the ideas about how to develop emotional wisdom181 and
master the art of dialogue,182 to conversations about the virtues of
promoting just relationships,183 empowering others,184 listening,185 and
paying attention.186
When communities of faith and/or social justice evaluate systems,
institutions, and organizations on how well they promote basic human
rights and moral values, they consider local culture and social context.187
For example, although both Starbucks Coffee Company (Starbucks) and
Levi Strauss & Co. (Levi Strauss) have established solid reputations for
181. A leader’s emotional wisdom is derived from the disposition he/she brings to the
organization. STEPHAN STRASSER, PHENOMENOLOGY OF FEELING: AN ESSAY ON THE PHENOMENA
OF THE HEART 185 (1997). Strasser writes about the “stirrings, shaming, exalting events, successes,
and defeat, [which] all have their dispositional reverberations.” Id.
Here are five skills that leaders with emotional wisdom demonstrate. They: (1) accept
people as they are; (2) accept relations and problems in terms of the present rather than of the past;
(3) treat those close to them with the same courteous attention that is extended to strangers and
acquaintances; (4) trust others, even if the risk seems great; (5) do not seek constant approval and
recognition from others. See TIMOTHY BROWN & PATRICIA SULLIVAN, SETTING HEARTS ON FIRE:
A SPIRITUALITY FOR LEADERS 51 (1997).
182. Martin Buber, a Jewish philosopher, explains that genuine dialogue means not only
thinking, talking and reasoning together, but also an all-out effort to establish mutual respect and
understanding. He suggests that dialogue is the very essence of communication between the leader
and followers and is inseparable from an effective ethic of care in leadership. BROWN & SULLIVAN,
supra note 179 at 35.
183. One definition of social justice is fidelity to the demands of a relationship. John R.
Donahue, Biblical Perspective on Justice, in THE FAITH THAT DOES JUSTICE 68, 69 (John C.
Haughey ed., 1977).
184. Empowerment is a humanistic exercise of power that frees people from problems of
dominance or oppression.
185. The Woodstock Theological Center has developed a set of questions that help
organizations listen to the aspirations of an organization. WOODSTOCK THEOLOGICAL CENTER,
CREATING
AND
MAINTAINING
AN
ETHICAL
CORPORATE
CLIENT
(1990),
http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/resources/books/Creating-an-Ethical-Corporate-Climate.html.
The Center suggests these questions: (1) Does top management have a common understanding of
and strong commitment to ethical values?; (2) Do management’s actions and values reflect the
organization’s values?; (3) Do employees throughout the firm share management’s ethical values
and commitment?; (4) Do managers at all levels work to build shared ethical values?; (5) Does
management provide employees with ethical guidance, when needed?; (6) Are ethical
considerations included in personnel decisions?; (7) Does the firm’s system of rewards include
ethical accountability?; (8) Does the organization have a procedure for identifying and dealing with
ethical violations?; (9) Does the organization have designated personnel whose job it is to monitor
and promote and ethical climate?; (10) As a result of all of the above, does every employee consider
ethical conduct, supervision, and guidance a part of the job? Id.
186. See generally Timothy Brown, Paying Attention, in GREAT IDEAS, GENTLE AS DOVES:
REFLECTIONS ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHINGS 8 (2003). Here is an ethic of care examen, created
by Fr. Brown for readers of this article: (1) look for a focus on paying attention to the dynamics in
the organization, (2) examine how relationships are going, (3) look for ways to reconcile
differences, (4) choose a new route to recovering right relationships.
187. See Yamada, supra note 167, at 554.
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acting upon an ethic of care, they do so in different ways. Starbucks is
known for treating its employees like partners.188 Levi Strauss is known
for its Worldwide Code of Business Conduct,189 and its more general
policies and practices, which recognize the competitive advantage
workers in developing countries rely on with regard to labor policies. In
this context, the company acts upon the assumption that, “in the long
run, educated and healthy workers are vital for economic
development.”190
It is important to note that ethical precepts in the context of TNCs
are not silver bullets. Some writers suggest that ethical precepts are soft
and ineffective.191 Jillian J. McMillan takes a stronger approach. 192 She
writes, convincingly, that is unlikely that the modern corporation can
engage in social responsibility in a way that reflects true care for fellow
human beings.193 In essence, she writes that the modern corporation is
incapable of taking society’s interests into account because its collective
and “serious institutionwide breakdown of character and ethics . . .
struck a devastating blow to [its] credibility.”194 She doubts whether a
discourse of “connection, reciprocity, and trust”195 can replace a
discourse that highlights “instrumentality, exclusivity, attribution,
monologue, and narcissism.”196 McMillan’s comments suggest that
188. See Press Release, Starbucks, Starbucks Demonstrates Unprecedented Level of
Commitment to Partner (Employee) Coffee Education and Training (Feb. 11, 2008),
http://news.starbucks.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=69.
189. See LEVI STRAUSS & CO., WORLDWIDE CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT (2006),
http://www.levistrauss.com/Downloads/WWCOC/WWCOC-English.pdf.
190. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 10, at 974.
191. See supra note 13.
192. Jillian J. McMillan, Why Corporate Social Responsibility? Why Now? How?, in THE
DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (Steve May, George Cheney & Juliet Roper
eds., 2007).
193. Id. at 15. McMillan argues that:
(1) that the modern corporation has accepted a role of social responsibility that it is illsuited to enact, (2) that the shared traits of corporate discourse are inappropriate to
promote CSR, and (3) that a reconsideration of ethos as participation and place offers a
more appropriate frame for corporate credibility and voice.
Id. McMillan bases her arguments on Aristotelian philosophy. She stresses the need for a “mutual
dwelling place,” which
stands to transform both corporate worlds and actions by: (1) replacing corporate
monologue with dialogue…; (2) replacing exclusivity with corporate profit/loss
accounting that assesses all stakeholders….; (3) replacing solitary measures of
instrumentality with measures of success in terms of human and social capital….; (4)
replacing external attribution with corporate accountability and disclosure . . . .
Id. at 25 (numbers added).
194. Id. at 16.
195. Id. at 22.
196. Id.
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ethical precepts may need reinforcement. They need to draw strength
from another mode of social control. The most likely mode of control to
offer meaningful reinforcement in the context of an ethic of care is
affinity group regulation.197
Epstein points out that global codes are general and lack
enforcement mechanisms. He writes that “[t]hey are aspirational
precepts rather than operational standards.”198 Presumably, Epstein sees
other aspirational precepts, including ethical precepts, as guides that are
difficult to translate into operational standards. Aspirational precepts
can, however, serve as the basis for operational standards. Managers
embrace operational standards, especially standards with outcomes that
can be measured, e.g., “what’s measured gets done.”199 When
organizations, measure, they report.
Reporting yields increased
accountability and transparency.
Associations, from professional bodies (e.g., the American Bar
Association),200 to religious authorities (e.g., the General Congregation
of the Society of Jesus),201 to social organizations, (e.g., the Girl Scouts
of America)202 establish standards of behavior for their members. They
impose standards on their own group, and they do so voluntarily, for the
good of their association and the constituents they serve. These
standards put ethical precepts into action, action that can be measured.
One industry that puts an ethic of care into measurable action is the
health care industry. According to Mark Hall, a health care law and
policy scholar, it is a natural for those who work in the health care
industry to deliver on an ethic of care to customers and communities203
because “[t]he vulnerability of patients and the suffering caused by

197. For an argument that law is a superior mode of social control, see Larry Catá Backer,
From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of
Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591 (2008) (“Hard international law can serve as a
vehicle for the enhancement of a market environment in which corporate stakeholders, and
principally consumers and investors, might incorporate information about corporate ‘social’
behavior in their consumption and investment decisions.”).
198. Epstein, supra note 25, at 215.
199. The idea that “what’s measured gets done” is a basic quality management principle.
200. See
MODEL
RULES
OF
PROF’L
CONDUCT,
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html.
201. See Jesuit.org, General Congregation 35, http://www.jesuit.org/index.php/main/aboutus/jesuit-conference/35th-general-congregation/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
202. See GIRL SCOUTS OF AMERICA, CAMP CODE OF CONDUCT, available at
http://www.campwest.org/handouts/vaughn_conduct%20code%20stats.pdf.
203. Hall, supra note 165, at 417.
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illness create moral conditions that compel and ethic of compassion.”204
He urges objective measures and reporting mechanisms that measure a
culture of care,205 urges us to compare health care providers in terms of
an ethic of care, and notes that “caring” is already measured in the health
care setting.
For example, accreditation standards and patient
satisfaction surveys consider an ethic.206 One highly regarded health
care consulting company, Press Ganey,207 writes,
Health care is a unique industry in which success is not measured
simply by financial returns. The most successful health care
organizations act upon the needs of all customers to improve the
delivery of care and achieve organizational results. It is our mission,
philosophy, work ethic, and dedication to hiring only the best that
208
allows us to help our clients succeed.

The existence and success of organizations such as Press Ganey
show that, in the health care industry, firms not only invest in an ethic of
care, but they measure it, and value the rewards that come from doing
well, especially awards that recognize excellence in quality
management.209 The health care industry shows the potential for
benchmarking, considering the best practices of the highest-performing
companies in an industry.210
Epstein makes it clear that six modes of social control,
“individually, and in combination, are critical to achieving socially
responsible corporate behavior.”211 However, in some contexts, such as
the ethic of care context, law, self regulation, a vigilant and responsible
media, and civil society, provide few additional incentives for
companies to become Good Companies. Scholars disagree about the
extent to which rules of law can make companies care.212 Even if rules
of law can promote an ethic of care, it is not clear we need laws in
204. Id. at 418; see also Lois Shepherd, supra note 172, at 456-59 (urging conversations about
responsibility in the health care setting, e.g., that health law attorneys look to what their clients
need, rather than asserting their clients’ rights).
205. Hall, supra note 165, at 421.
206. Id. at 423.
For information about Press Ganey, see Press Ganey,
http://www.pressganey.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
207. Press Ganey partners with over 10,000 health care organizations. Press Ganey,
Pressroom, http://www.pressganey.com/cs/pressroom (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
208. Press Ganey About Press Ganey, http://www.pressganey.com/cs/about_press_ganey (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010).
209. See, e.g., Baldridge National Quality Program, http://www.baldrige.nist.gov/.
210. Ford, supra note 13, at 41.
211. Epstein, supra note 25, at 212.
212. See supra note 34. But see Yamada, supra note 167, at 554 (“The law cannot force
organizations to care about the health and well-being of their employees.”).
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certain industries; some industries gather information, engage in
monitoring, and disclose results voluntarily. Self-regulation means
voluntary acceptance of standards, which Epstein indicates are inspired
by NGOs.213 Affinity group regulation and self-regulation in the context
of an ethic of care are complementary in some industries, such as health
care. For example, Johnson & Johnson engages in self-regulation by
adhering to a credo that ranks people higher than profits.214 The
company acts based upon its credo, presumably as an act of selfregulation. In doing so, the organization acts in accordance with
expectations from others in the health care field. The remaining modes
of social control, vigilant and responsible media and engaged civil
society, hold promise in promoting an ethic of care.215 However, actors
in the media and concerned citizens are more likely to, and should, use
their energy to combat the antithesis of an ethic of care, that is, outright
exploitation and abuse.
III. REVISITING EPSTEIN’S “GOOD COMPANY” FRAMEWORK
Epstein accurately considers the CSR movement as fundamentally
incapable of achieving the Good Company.216 Part of this incapability
stems from the traditional debate between those arguing that TNCs
should engage in CSR because they ought to do good for goodness
sake217 and those viewing such arguments, by their own nature, as being
inherently lost in translation if not linked with the corporate bottom
line.218 Irrespective of the normative values underpinning the CSR
213. Epstein, supra note 25, at 211.
214. Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo Values, http://www.jnj.com/connect/about-jnj/jnjcredo/?flash=true (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
215. Epstein, supra note 25, at 212.
216. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market
for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009) (characterizing the philosophical underpinnings of the
CSR movement as based on the view that corporations have a moral duty to do good for others,
even at the expense of the bottom line); see also David P. Baron, The Positive Theory of Moral
Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance 5 (June 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=913808 (arguing that one of the principles underlying the CSR movement
is that corporations have an abstract “moral duty” to do good).
218. See Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need for a Safe
Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 399 (2008)
(explaining the reason why certain corporations do not engage in CSR). Brown argues it is partly
due to the fact that following CSR principles is more expensive than not and these added costs
cannot always be passed along to the consumer. Id. Moreover, Brown argues that “[p]art of those
added costs are the costs associated with increased risk of litigation that corporations adopting codes
that embody CSR principles face.” Id. See also Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum:
Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 839
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movement, many critics argue that it is now effectively co-opted by
corporate marketing strategies.219 Indeed, some argue that the modern
CSR movement is little more than an elaborate public relations charade
whereby TNCs perform certain prescribed rituals while continuing to
conduct business as usual.220
Epstein’s framework recasts the
conception of the socially responsible corporation not as an organization
responsive to an often inchoate CSR movement, but an organization
operating at the nexus of certain metrics, or modes of social control.
As noted earlier, Epstein lists his modes of social control in
descending order of importance: law, affinity group regulation, selfregulation, ethical precepts, the media, and an engaged civil society.221
While Epstein effectively describes the modes that contextualize the
challenges in attaining the Good Company, his prescribed order of
importance unnecessarily constrains the modes’ ability to perform their
function. For example, as evidenced by the application of Epstein’s
framework to the child labor222 and ethic of care223 matters, law can, in
fact, be the least important mode through which to attain the Good
Company. Indeed, reliance on an overarching legal framework in order
to end child labor can be counterproductive by exacerbating the very
problems such legal regimes are meant to resolve.224 As such, Epstein’s
(2008) (characterizing CSR as profit-centric). Kerr explains that since the effects of CSR on the
bottom line have become quantifiable, the law supports, if not requires, TNC managers to
investigate and consider whether CSR can impact the bottom line. Id. Kerr further argues that a
TNC manager who does not consider such linkages could be considered derelict in her duty. Id.
219. See, e.g., S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR CREATING
CODES OF CONDUCT IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2003) (regarding the marketing benefits
from CSR and the widespread practice of insufficient or inconsistent implementation); see Pitts, supra
note 11, at § III (finding credible the critiques that consider “CSR as, at best, toothless and marketingoriented, and at worst a malevolent strategy to co-opt or render powerless the critical forces hoping to
tame corporations with the more meaningful constraints of law”); Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S
Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 838 (2007) (arguing that “some companies introduce CSR practices at a
superficial level for window-dressing purposes”); Betsy Atkins, Is Corporate Social Responsibility
Responsible?, FORBES.COM, Nov. 28, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/corporatecitizenship/2006/11/16/
leadership-philanthropy-charity-lead-citizen-cx_ba_1128directorship.html (detailing the disingenuousness
of TNC CSR campaigns). Atkins writes that “[t]here are practical reasons why corporations should
cloak themselves in the politically correct rhetoric of social responsibility . . . [b]ut marketing should
not be confused with significant deployments of corporate assets.” Id. See also Gill, supra note 13, at
462 (arguing that CSR “has become a business-sensitive, if not business-driven practice”). Gill notes
that many critics consider the original social change motives of CSR to have been effectively
subordinated to TNC marketing strategies. Id.
220. See supra note 216.
221. See Epstein, supra note 25, at 213.
222. See discussion infra Part II-A.
223. See discussion infra Part II-C.
224. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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prescribed order of importance—or any order of importance—lacks the
flexibility to effectively scrutinize certain problems that continually
challenge TNCs as they conduct business.
Epstein’s argument that each mode, individually and in
combination, must be used in order to achieve the Good Company
similarly runs afoul of the flexibility needed to approach complex
business issues. As seen with the treatment of the child labor,225
improved employer-employee bargaining,226 and ethic of care matters,227
some modes may be essential while others may be either irrelevant228 or
detrimental229 in encouraging the Good Company. While Epstein’s
proposition that the modes of social control must be both considered in a
precise order and in concert, they may be asymmetric to challenges
faced by TNCs as they conduct business. The modes do, however,
provide a sufficient foundation for how these challenges can be faced
with a New Governance approach.
A New Governance approach would emphasize the importance of
matching the appropriate mode of social control with the specific
challenges facing TNCs.230 Instead of focusing on overarching legal
prohibitions and adversarial enforcement,231 New Governance
approaches consider ongoing deliberation between TNCs and a broad
range of stakeholder groups, which have access to local information and
context-specific understanding of business problems, as the most
effective mechanism for making decisions in complex fast-paced
business environments.232 Such an industry and situation-specific use of
225. See discussion infra Part II-A.
226. See discussion infra Part II-B.
227. See discussion infra Part II-C.
228. See discussion infra Part II-C (noting the irrelevance of the “self regulation,” “vigilant and
responsible media,” and the “engaged civil society” modes of social control).
229. See discussion infra Part II-A (noting the counterproductive nature of the “law” mode of
social control).
230. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 39 (1992) (arguing that the adoption of a strategy that allows the changing
of regulatory instruments in light of circumstances may be the most effective approach at
influencing the behavior of TNCs).
231. See Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Law of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433, 471 (2009) (arguing against the effectiveness of legal
prohibitions and adversarial enforcement in affecting corporate behavior). Lobel writes:
Over the past five decades, top-down rules and adversarial enforcement—the hallmark
of command-and-control—have often failed to achieve their intended goals of increasing
compliance and, at times, have been counter-productive in regulating private industry.
In particular, as technology and production methods change rapidly, it is virtually
impossible to address all the risks of production and work through universal standards.
Id.
232. Ford, supra note 13, at 27-28 (explaining the dynamics of New Governance approaches).
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Epstein’s modes of social control will have three favorable results in
achieving the Good Company. Namely, such an approach: (1) creates a
larger pool of context-specific information;233 (2) ensures the
representation of a broad range of stakeholder views;234 and (3) holds
TNC managers accountable to the public.235 In this way, adapting
Epstein’s modes of social control to a New Governance approach
provides a rational, systemic alternative to draconian rule-making and
their often adverse effects of business.236
IV. CONCLUSION
Epstein writes that:
Harnessing the energies … of powerful corporate engines for socially
efficacious purposes yet rendering them accountable for their
deleterious impacts on other sectors of society and assuring them they
would be good companies has been the objective of public policy and
an enduring private concern on the part of intellectuals, religious
authorities and ordinary citizens since the emergence of the
237
megacorporation of the nineteenth century.

In the context of increasing global concerns about the misbehavior
of TNCs, Epstein’s modes of social control, combined with his vision
for these modes, work together to incentivize companies and serve as a
starting point for robust conversations about how to promote improved
corporate cultures—especially those cultures that can impact human
rights and social change in positive ways.
We have considered three distinct employment law issues: (1)
curbing the use of child labor;238 (2) improving employer-employee
bargaining;239 and (3) providing an ethic of care for employees.240 In
applying Epstein’s vision of how modes of social control incentivize
companies in the employment context, we have observed that his
prescribed use of the modes unnecessarily constrains the ability of the

233. Primarily through collaboration with NGO’s and an engaged civil society (an adaptation
of the “self regulation” and “engaged civil society” modes of social control). See Epstein, supra
note 25, at 211-12.
234. Id.
235. Primarily through the “vigilant and responsible media” and “engaged civil society” modes
of social control. See Epstein, supra note 25, at 212.
236. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
237. See Epstein, supra note 25, at 208.
238. See discussion supra Part II-A.
239. See discussion supra Part II-B.
240. See discussion supra Part II-C.
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modes to actualize Good Companies.241 We argue that New Governance
language lends flexibility to Epstein’s framework.242 In essence, when
Epstein’s framework intersects with New Governance priorities—
especially collaboration, dialogue, innovation, and pragmatic learning—
the consequence is a more flexible role for the modes of social control, a
role that promises corporate cultures that are mindful, conscious, and
self-scrutinizing in terms of the social consequences of their business
practices. Indeed, such an approach aspires to realize Epstein’s Good
Company.

241. See supra Part III.
242. See supra Part III.
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